



Nuclear Explosion Monitoring: An overview of the global monitoring system

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October 11th, 2018

Applied Antineutrino Workshop



PNNL is operated by Battelle for the U.S. Department of Energy






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Outline

- Historical Perspective
- Nuclear explosion monitoring technologies
 - Seismic sensors (land)
 - Hydroacoustic (water)
 - Infrasound (air)
 - Radionuclide
 - ✓ Particulate
 - ✓ Noble Gas
- Monitoring Criteria


PNNL Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Program

- History of program dates back to the Hanford Pu production mission and environment measurements associated with it
 - A nuclear explosion monitoring program was born
- The “modern” PNNL nuclear explosion monitoring program began in mid-1992
 - ✓ Operation of the U.S. Certified Radionuclide Laboratory, RL-16
 - ✓ Development of the particulate and noble gas monitoring systems
 - IMS technologies
 - ✓ Technology for radionuclide detection
 - ✓ Xenon International




Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Overview

- Total International Monitoring System cost is ~\$1B with a ~\$100M operating cost per year




Seismic Overview

- Seismic sensors around the world detect motion geologic motion
 - Focus on P-waves and S-waves




Seismic Capabilities

- The large network of 170 seismic sensors allows for:
 - Event identification
 - Characterization (earthquake versus explosion)
 - Additional sensors are operated throughout the world to monitor for earthquakes (USGS)




$$mb = 3.92 + 0.81 \log W \text{ (NTS)}$$

$$mb = 4.45 + 0.75 \log W \text{ (Semi)}$$




Seismic Capabilities

- The use of multiple seismic sensors for event characterization also allows for a location determination



Global detection threshold of ~0.5 kT



The error ellipse (red) has shrunk to +/- 6.7 km or 109 km²

Hydroacoustic Overview


- Only 11 stations are required to monitor around the world
 - Sound waves propagate efficiently through the water

Trunk cable deployed from shore

Three anchor/electronics nodes



Three mid-water hydrophone assemblies

Two inter-node cables and one tail cable





Infrasound Overview

- Monitoring for the (small) pressure waves that travel throughout the atmosphere from an explosion
- 60 stations around the world




Infrasound Capabilities

- Infrasound can be used for location of the explosion event
 - Generally seismic does a better job, but the combination of infrasound and seismic could further improve the localization







Radionuclide Particulate Overview

- 80 Stations around the world that collect particulate with air filters
- Minimum Detectable Concentrations of order $\mu\text{Bq}/\text{m}^3$ levels
- Samples are routinely reanalyzed in the laboratory environment






Radionuclide Noble Gas Overview

- Radioxenon is produced during the fission process
 - Escapes the underground explosion via fractures
 - Transported through the atmosphere
 - Detected via automated detection systems
 - Can be re-measured by a network of laboratory systems
- Radioargon would be looked for during a site inspection



Radionuclide Noble Gas Capabilities

- 40 Stations around the world that collect gas and extract the xenon (87 ppb)
- Minimum Detectable Concentrations of order mBq/m³ levels (1000 atoms)



Monitoring Requirements

- Monitor for nuclear explosions around the world
- Improved confidence through replicate measurements
 - Multiple seismic stations
 - Particulate and Radioxenon at RN stations
 - Secondary RN measurement in the laboratory environment
- In order for technologies to add to the monitoring network:
 - A detection threshold of order 1 kT is required (see Seismic capabilities)
 - Potential stand-off of ~1000 km is required (see RN spacing)

References

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Thank you

